EXHIBIT A

	Page 1
1	
2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 05-44481 (RDD)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
7	
8	DPH HOLDINGS CORP., et al.,
9	
10	Reorganized Debtors.
11	
12	x
13	
14	United States Bankruptcy Court
15	300 Quarropas Street
16	White Plains, New York
17	
18	September 22, 2011
19	10:09 AM
20	
21	BEFORE:
22	HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	

	Page 2
1	
2	HEARING re Motion For Recoupment on Behalf of Delphi Salaried
3	Retirees
4	
5	HEARING re Claims Objection Hearing Regarding Claims of Alla
6	Averbukh, on Behalf of the Estate of Boris Averbukh, as
7	Objected to in the Reorganized Debtors' Motion for Order (i)
8	Enforcing Modification Procedures Order, Modified Plan and Plan
9	Modification Order Injunction and Forty-Seventh Omnibus Claims
10	Objection Order Against Averbukhs, as Plaintiffs, in Maryland
11	State Court Wrongful Death Action; and (ii) Directing Averbukhs
12	to Dismiss Action to Recover Upon Discharged and Expunged Claim
13	("Averbukh Injunction Motion")
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	Transcribed by: Lisa Bar-Leib

	Page 3	
1		
2	APPEARANCES:	
3	BUTZEL LONG, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION	
4	Attorneys for DPH Holdings Corp., et al., Reorganized	
5	Debtors	
6	Suite 100	
7	150 West Jefferson Avenue	
8	Detroit, MI 48226	
9		
10	BY: CYNTHIA J. HAFFEY, ESQ.	
11		
12	BUTZEL LONG, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION	
13	Attorneys for DPH Holdings Corp., et al., Reorganized	
14	Debtors	
15	Stoneridge West	
16	41000 Woodward Avenue	
17	Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304	
18		
19	BY: SHELDON H. KLEIN, ESQ.	
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

	Page 4
1	
2	SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
3	Attorneys for DPH Holdings Corp., et al., Reorganized
4	Debtors
5	155 North Wacker Drive
6	Chicago, IL 60606
7	
8	BY: LOUIS S. CHIAPPETTA, ESQ.
9	(TELEPHONICALLY)
10	
11	CIARDI CIARDI & ASTIN
12	Attorneys for Vladimir Averbukh (Individually and as
13	Personal Representative for the Estate of Boris
14	Averbukh) and Alesander Averbukh
15	100 Church Street
16	8th Floor
17	New York, NY 10007
18	
19	BY: RICK A. STEINBERG, ESQ.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 5
1	
2	ALSO APPEARING:
3	JAMES B. SUMPTER
4	On Behalf of Himself as a Delphi Salaried Retiree
5	21169 Westbay Circle
6	Noblesville, IN 46062
7	
8	BY: JAMES B. SUMPTER, PRO SE
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

Page 40

THE COURT: Okay. I have before me a motion by the debtors -- or the reorganized debtors, DPH Holdings Corp., to enforce the order entered by this Court on July 30th, 2009, the so-called plan modification order which confirms the modified plan of the Delphi debtors. Specifically, the motion seeks to enforce paragraphs 20 and 22 of the plan modification order. The first paragraph, paragraph 20, incorporates into the confirmation order the discharge of the Delphi debtors found in paragraph -- or Article 11.2 of Delphi's first amended plan as modified under Section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code which discharges all pre-effective date, that is pre the date when Delphi's modified plan went effective, claims and causes of action, whether known or unknown, whether fixed or unliquidated against the Delphi debtors.

Paragraph 22 of the plan modification order is a permanent injunction of all persons on or after the effective date from commencing or continuing in any manner any claim, action, appointment of process or other proceeding of any kind with respect to any claim, cause of action or any other right or claim against the reorganized debtors which they possess or may possess prior to the effective date, again, the effective date of the confirmed modified plan.

The reorganized debtors seek to enforce those two provisions of the July 15th -- I'm sorry -- the July 30th, 2009 order against the plaintiffs in a personal injury lawsuit

Page	41
- 49	

commenced in September of 2009 by Vladimir and Alesander

Averbukh and naming Alla Averbukh as a use party in Maryland

state court based on the wrongful death of Boris Averbukh in a

car accident that occurred in 2007.

Those dates are important. The accident occurred in 2007. The lawsuit was commenced in September of 2009 after the effective date of Delphi's modified plan. And in addition, the car accident occurred, as I said, in 2007 during the pendency of Delphi's Chapter 11 case which began in October of 2005. The accident also occurred in the period from October 2005 through June 1, 2009 covered by the Court's order establishing administrative claims bar date in Delphi case of July 15th, 2009 by which to assert any administrative claims falling within that period.

The record reflects that the first time that Delphi was aware of the lawsuit was when it was commenced, in September of 2009. In addition, in November of 2009 -- I'm sorry. I've gotten my dates wrong.

The first time that Delphi was aware of the claim was when Alla Averbukh filed a proof of administrative claim in September of 2009, approximately forty-eight days after the administrative claims bar date. The lawsuit was not commenced until November of 2009 by Boris' estate with his two sons, Vladimir and Alesander, with Alla named as a use party. So to be clear, Delphi was not aware, on this record before me, of

Page	42
------	----

the existence of the car accident or the claim until Alla filed her administrative expense claim after the administrative claims bar date in September of 2009, the lawsuit itself not being commenced until November of 2009.

The reorganized debtors objected to Alla Averbukh's proof of claim as being untimely. And in May of 2010, this Court entered an order disallowing and expunging that claim. The debtors also made demand of the Averbukhs and their counsel thereafter to discontinue the Maryland state court action on the basis that it was in violation of the plan modification order, the debtors' discharge and now also as well in violation of the May 2010 order disallowing Alla's claim. The basis for the latter assertion is Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. Section 3-904 (2011) which restricts actions in respect of the death of a person, that is wrongful death actions like the Maryland state court action, to only one The debtors contend that since Alla's claim premised upon the wrongful death of Boris was disallowed by this Court in May of 2010, the parties to the Maryland wrongful death action are now barred by statutory res judicata or claim preclusion by Section 3-904.

The plaintiffs in the wrongful death action did not cease the action nor did they cease -- nor did they seek relief from the Court's bar date order, the Court's plan modification order or the Court's order from May 2010 disallowing Alla's

1

2

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Da	σe	1	3
Pa	ue	4	_

proof of claim. Instead, the debtors were forced to bring this motion to enforce all of those orders.

In response, the claimants assert effectively, or really, only one issue which is that they did not receive sufficient notice for due process purposes of any of the orders that the debtors contend bar, as a matter of res judicata, their continued prosecution of the state court lawsuit.

It is, of course, the case that to be enforceable, an order, including a discharge order, must comply with due process under the Fifth Amendment. See, for example, In re Enron Corporation, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 894 at 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2006) and In re Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 130 B.R. 717, 719-20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).

The case law is clear that for known claimants, claimants known to be such by the debtor, the debtor must provide actual notice of a bar date and/or a proposed confirmation order that would effectuate a bankruptcy discharge. However, for unknown claimants, the debtor need provide notice reasonably calculated to reach them and permitting a reasonable amount of time for response and reasonably conveys all of the required information. Such notice, again for an unknown creditor, may be made by publication. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 317 (1950). See also Daewoo International America Corp. Creditor Trust v. SSTS America Corp., 2003 U.S.

Page	44
------	----

Dist. LEXIS 9802 at 7-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003); In re Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 130 B.R. at 719-20; and see also Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3rd Cir. 1995) as well as In re J.A. Jones, Inc., 492 F.3d. 242 (4th Cir. 2007) making a distinction between a known personal injury claimant who's entitled to actual notice and unknown personal injury claimants who are entitled to reasonable publication notice.

Here, the record is undisputed that the debtors provided publication notice to unknown claimants on a wide basis that was previously approved by the Court and the actual content of that notice or its reasonableness are not in dispute. There's also nothing in the record to refute the obvious facts from the dates that I went through that the debtors were not aware of this claim until it was filed by Alla in November of 2009 after the entry of the administrative claims bar date order and the modified plan confirmation order and then subsequently when the litigation was commenced by Alesander and Vladimir naming Alla in November of 2009.

In light of the foregoing, I conclude that there was sufficient notice for due process purposes under Mullane and the cases that I've cited and that consequently, the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the Maryland action are barred by the debtors' discharge under Section 11.2 of the plan and paragraph 20 of the plan modification order as well as the permanent injunction set forth in paragraph 22 of the plan

Pa	age	4.	5

confirmation order. In addition, they are barred, as I've already found and as is law of the case, by my order of May 2010 disallowing Alla's proof of administrative expense claim in this case as being untimely.

The plaintiffs in the Maryland state action seek relief from "the Court's relevant orders" in their response to the debtors' motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 which incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 60. They are precluded by the express terms of Bankruptcy Rule 9024, however, from seeking relief from the plan modification order given that Section 1144 of the Bankruptcy Code is an exception expressly in Bankruptcy Rule 9024. And Section 1144 provides that a party may seek revocation of a plan confirmation order until 180 days after the entry of that order but if, and only if, the order was procured by fraud which is not asserted here.

In addition, other than the issue of notice, which I've already addressed, no grounds are raised for relief from the bar date order which is now over two years old and which the Averbukhs had notice of, as well as their law firm, at least as of the date of the debtors' objection to Alla's proof of claim which, again, I granted in May of 2010 in which has not sought to have overturned since then. So there really is no basis for such requested relief even from the bar date order under Bankruptcy Rule 9012 nor any specific fact alleged other than the issue of notice which I've already dealt with as

Page 46

giving a basis for such relief.

Finally, as an alternative ground, I believe that the debtors are correct that leaving aside the res judicata effect and binding effect given my belief that the Averbukhs received sufficient notice for due process purposes of the plan modification order and the discharge is the fact that, as a result of my May 2010 order disallowing Alla's claim based on the wrongful death that is also the basis for the Maryland state action, Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. Section 3-904 precludes, as a matter of statutory res judicata, Alesander and Vladimir proceeding with the action that has already been effectively ruled on by me in May of 2010 by disallowing Alla's wrongful death claim.

So the debtors' motion is granted on those separate alternative grounds. I frankly don't even understand the contention that was made at oral argument that the debtor should permit the Averbukhs to liquidate their claim in Maryland state court in the face of the discharge and the injunction in paragraph 22 of the plan modification order which expressly prohibits the commencement or continuation of any proceeding in respect of any claim arising before the effective date. That's why a debtor gets a discharge in a plan confirmation order and that's why a debtor gets a bar date order which these parties were clearly in violation of by asserting pre-effective date claims which these claims clearly

	Page 47
1	are under Reading Company v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968) and In
2	re Refco Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2484 at 17 (S.D.N.Y.
3	January 14, 2008).
4	So the debtors can submit an order consistent with
5	that ruling.
6	MR. KLEIN: Your Honor
7	THE COURT: It's without prejudice to the debtors'
8	rights to seek sanctions for violation of the Court's orders.
9	MR. KLEIN: And this may be implicit in your last
10	remark but I would ask that the order include a mandatory
11	injunction directing them to dismiss the Maryland action so we
12	don't have to incur the costs of doing anything beyond this.
13	THE COURT: Well, that's appropriate.
14	MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, if I may, there was an
15	order proposed order submitted by the reorganized debtors
16	with their motion. I'm not sure if they want a different order
17	than that.
18	THE COURT: I want a different order than that. It's
19	my order. I don't understand why this law firm didn't comply
20	with the debtors' request in the first place. I know you're
21	saying you're not really involved with that so I'm not really
22	addressing this so much to you as to them. But this was just a
23	clear violation. I don't know what they were thinking.
24	MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Okay.